The New Normal Crisis

[zdo 20]

...the new normal crisis...

http://www.traderslaboratory.com/forums/general-discussion/9767-fiat-money-4.html#post171982

 

wtf is the “new normal”?

[zdo 20]

the "New Normal Crisis"

Japan To Slash Welfare Benefits In Attempt To Root Out "Comfortably Poor" | Zero Hedge

 

...

still - wtf is the new normal

[Gekko78 10]

the "New Normal Crisis"

Japan To Slash Welfare Benefits In Attempt To Root Out "Comfortably Poor" | Zero Hedge

 

...

still - wtf is the new normal

 

I read a book by Ken Fisher where he says the "new normal" is the "old normal" and that there is in fact no "new normal" just recycled things from history that others are not aware of so they call them "new"

 

 

So the new normal , is the old normal and the old normal is in fact the new normal. So the new normal is quite old which makes it new ......you see??:hmmmm:

Lots of interesting facts in that book .

[zdo 20]

I read a book by Ken Fisher where he says the "new normal" is the "old normal" .

ok. wtf is the "old normal" ?

[zdo 20]

more wtf is the new normal ?

 

From Charles Gave of GaveKal.com

 

A Recantation

 

Over the years a number of economists and political scientists have seen the error of their ways and come clean with a reasoned recantation. The mid-19th century British thinker John Stuart Mill famously changed his mind on the divisive question of industrial wages. My contribution to political economy hardly matches Mill’s, but I have spent my adult life pondering the linkages between economics and markets. However, in recent times I have come to realize that I was wrong in my most basic understanding of these relationships. So for the edification of younger readers, and possibly future generations, I have composed a single document to explain my about-face; to my tormentors I hope this proves that I have left behind impure thoughts and incorrect reasoning!

 

My recantation will take the form of key lessons learned:

 

Lesson #1 Government agencies allocate capital better than the private sector

 

We have moved into a new world where it is no longer necessary to have the market decide short rates, long rates or, for that matter, the currency exchange rate. This happy state of affairs started with euro’s adoption in 2000 and intensified in 2002 when US real interest rates were driven negative. Given the massive successes of these policies, the authorities have expanded their horizon to seize control of other troublesome prices such as salaries, either by fixing them (minimum wages and the capping of financial professionals’ bonuses), taxing “excessive” remuneration (think anything above the minimum wage, especially in France). Even more creatively, new regulations such as Basel III or Solvency II have compelled savings to be invested in government securities rather than financing private sector capital spending. This properly “guided” financial system means a portfolio invested 50/50 in US and German bonds since 2000 has outperformed pretty much all assets with the exception of gold (we expect a directive banning the use of the “barbarous relic” anytime soon). Such a portfolio of government securities, I am told, will continue to outperform for the foreseeable future, and I, of course, believe it. Moreover, the next step will be to control the price of disorderly markets that still exist for traded goods and salaries. And the perfectly dreadful free movement of capital will soon be brought to heel through foreign exchange controls. Hence, a portfolio of securities issued by such enlightened authorities will surely outperform for the foreseeable future.

 

Lesson #2 Central banks should control asset prices and prevent them from falling

 

The problem with capitalism (a most disruptive and chaotic economic paradigm as anyone with a proper historical understanding knows) is that asset prices can jump around depending on financial market participants’ reading of "the expected marginal rate of return on capital". For this reason, central banks will soon act to phase out numerically inexact "expectations" since serious decision makers operate only in an environment of full certainty. This means that asset prices will henceforth only go up, and those market participants who disagree will be dissuaded through a restriction that makes “anti-social” trading activity prohibitively expensive (the Tobin tax on financial transactions). Unhealthy volatility will be removed by banning short sales. Another factor supporting prices is the punitive taxation of capital gains as very few wealthy people will now sell anything. And since such benign interventions must expunge risk from the economic system, it is only fair (and logical) to tax capital at the same rate as labor—France is, of course, leading the world.

 

Lesson #3 Darwin & Schumpeter were wrong, creationists are right; there is such a thing as a free lunch

 

I once thought that economic growth emerged from the unplanned process of "creative destruction" identified by a charlatan Austrian-American economist named Schumpeter. This was a misunderstanding since wealth and economic growth are both created "ex nihilo" by a benevolent god called "the state," whose role is to stimulate demand by buying goods and services that nobody needs with money that does not exist. This process, of course, leads to an ever rising standard of living.

 

Such truth was revealed by a great prophet named "Keynes" who some years ago endowed a new church and its clergy of "civil servants" who obey the orders of their economist cardinals. Such fellows are beyond criticism as they selflessly strive to improve the lives of lesser mortals. For their service and their abnegation, they are usually very well paid (as the clergy class always is when it supports the dominant political power). They deserve their stipend, or at least this is what they say, and, of course, unnecessary questioning of settled truths can be a bad career move.

 

Lesson #4 Towards a new orthopraxy

 

The promise of this religion is that compliance with the clergy’s edicts will ensure a happy and prosperous life. How do the new economic clergy measure whether its followers’ actions meet divine approval? By using a quantitative measurement called "the GDP"—a central feature of the Keynesian catechism that mixes added values created by the private sector through voluntary transactions and costs incurred by the public sector. (see GDP As A Concept: Misleading If Not Downright Criminal) These public sector costs are funded from taxes (the ignorant might assume such deductions would reduce incomes, but miraculously they do not) and through borrowings. It is an article of faith that any damage to the national balance sheet from the resulting debt will not be recognized. Hence, I will incant in a lusty fashion "glory to the GDP," even if my recidivist inner-self mutters a little like Galileo, "et pur si muove.”

 

Lesson #5 Wondrous tools used by the clergy to grow GDP

 

The new clergy uses two tools to guarantee that GDP always gets bigger. It prints "money" which is used to buy government debt and in turn allows the clergy to purchase goods and services on behalf of a needy population. For sure, some citizens may crave worldly vices bought with their own money, but mercifully the good shepherds know best. In order to secure economic control the new clergy needed to capture the central bank(s). Of course, in any reformation there will be apostates; in this case the unreconstructed German central bank which continues to resist the doctrinal shift propagated by Pope Heli I, a brilliant theoretician from the new world who has even promised to dispense money from the skies. Pope Heli I, together with leading cardinals in Europe and Japan, detests the old elite and their quaint belief in monetary orthodoxy. Why this backward-looking ancien regime clings to its old fashioned "market fundamentalism" is beyond me. Looking back, I wonder how I ever supported a group that did not promise happiness on earth for all.

 

Lesson #6 How to finance infinite needs

 

This is where the miracle promised by the new faith manifests itself. The elected government issues debt in unlimited amounts to pay for the politicians promises. Hey presto! The old malediction of penury has disappeared as the ability to pay has been unshackled from any worldly constraint. This new debt is bought by the central bank on the most pious orders of Pope Heli I.

 

Heli I’s omnipotence is revealed by his ability to part the sea of market turmoil and set interest rates on the new debt at zero. Even if the government issues an infinite amount of debt the fact that it pays zero interest means the service cost will remain zero. Truly, water into wine! Only a small and increasingly marginalized group of deficit hawks fail to appreciate the beauty of the new construction. The true believers, who proudly proclaim themselves "deficits deniers'" have seen the light and promise to lead their flock into a promised land of unlimited borrowing with no downside (see Deficit Deniers Of The World Unite).

 

I am puzzled that no one has thought of such an idea before, but then again what need have I for reading history—especially economic history— when, like Heli I, I can rely on my models. After all, these new revelatory tools of science have passed all tests of statistical significance. It does not matter that their forecasts have been consistently faulty—the model is compliant with the Keynesian sacred books.

 

In summary my new faith can be understood as follows:

 

1.Government allocates capital better than the private sector, and should use interest rates, exchange rates, price fixing, price controls or whatever artifice it deems fit to ensure that capital goes to where it is properly directed.

2.The alpha and omega of the central bank’s proper role is to finance government spending.

3.Money belongs to the government, as we have seen properly demonstrated this week in Cyprus.

4.Property rights, the antediluvian obsession of the market fundamentalists, have been subject to a doctrinal revision “the template” as also shown this week in the eastern Mediterranean.

5.As a result of this new paradigm, asset prices must rise for the foreseeable future so long as Heli I decrees that the money printers keep printing. How can asset prices fall while the US central bank is printing more than $80bn a month? Even the unreformed Bundesbankers will surely grasp that if the European Central Bank did the same thing, the euro's problems would disappear overnight and prosperity would swiftly return to southern Europe, (Really, Germans should not be allowed into politics until they have had a primer indoctrination at either Cambridge or Princeton.)

6.More money creates more wealth, and more wealth, especially in real estate, creates more jobs—evidence to the contrary in Spain only represents a small setback on this road to happiness. As we all know, a rise in real estate prices leads to a massive increase in productivity, a prerequisite for an increase in the standard of living.

7.Services or goods provided to the population by the government, borrowing money from the central bank to pay the fellows who produce the goods that nobody needs with money that does not exist, will add tremendously to the GDP. This is a sure sign that the right policy is being pursued.

8.These goods and services anyway have a higher moral value than the ones produced in the private sector. One should simply compare the "social usefulness" (a favorite notion of Lenin and Stalin) of a nurse versus a hedge fund manager to be convinced. I rest my case.

 

So from now on, I will buy what the US, UK, French, Spanish, or for that matter Greek governments and central banks tell me to buy. I cannot afford to offend the new clergy. As a market “intellectual” the risks to my social standing, not to mention career prospects, are too high. One day if I keep my nose clean and my thoughts pure, I may just be admitted to the College of Cardinals.

[SIUYA 11]

I stumbled across this.....by John Kay (John Kay - The key to the banks)

 

The key to the banks

 

Great size is a warning of trouble ahead in the banking industry; and the trouble may be for the taxpayer as much as the shareholder.

 

We were just starting to get used to the extraordinary conjunctions of names in the City of London today. Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, ING Barings, SBC Warburg Dillon Reed. Goodness knows what the original wing-collared Mr Kleinwort and Mr Benson, Mr Morgan and Mr Grenfell, think of all this as they look down, stiff-necked and wing-collared, from their portraits in the lunch rooms.

 

Still, we all knew this was the future. Big balance sheets were best in modern banking. Full service financial conglomerates would drive out other players. But suddenly no-one is quite so sure. UBS, having carelessly lost its chairman, is reviewing the scope of its activities. The continental universal banking scene is shaken, perhaps even stirred.

 

The merger of UBS and SBC made the combined bank the largest in the world, measured by net assets. In achieving this, it pushed the Japanese bank Dai-Ichi Kangyo into tenth place in the world banking league. It is not long since Dai-Ichi Kangyo was the world’s largest bank. Not much longer since Citicorp held that position. Once, Bank of America was the biggest bank. And, within living memory, that title was held by Britain’s Midland, who ceded it to Barclays. Soon after, each of these banks not only lost their leading position, but dropped out of the top ten.

 

Much the same thing happened to other banks from the same countries. Hard though it is to believe today, the British clearing banks once dominated the world banking scene. The Americans took over, although their growth was inhibited by restrictions on out of state retail banking: still, Citicorp, the largest bank in New York, and Bank of America, biggest in California, found their local areas more than sufficient to provide support for their wider ambitions. But by the end of the 1980s, the list of the largest banks was dominated by the French and the Japanese. Not any more. While the merger of Bank of Tokyo and Mitsubishi has kept one Japanese bank up with the leaders, the pole positions today are taken by continental Europeans: Deutsche, Credit Suisse, and the new UBS-SBC combine.

 

This story has several important lessons for today’s ambitious bankers. Size has never been the key to future success in banking. Indeed size has almost invariably been a warning of problems to come. In most markets, you have to persuade customers to give you money: in lending, you only have to persuade them to accept it. That makes it rather easy to grow, but the growth can be subsequently reversed if the customers fail to pay it back. And that has happened rather often in banking history.

 

We also see the insatiable herd instinct of bankers. Citicorp is constantly eyeing Bank of America, Barclays vying with National Westminster, SBC with UBS and Credit Suisse. Not daring to be left behind, they all make the same mistakes together. Much safer, in the banking world, to be wrong in good company than to be right alone.

 

But the key lessons lie further below the surface. Banks as we know them originate in a time when they collected small savings to provide capital for businesses. The traditional local bank manager, his roots in the community, was well equipped to garner the deposits and assess the borrowers. Today, the skills of the financial services retailer are very different from those of the business banker. Securitisation of markets broke any necessary connection between taking deposits and making loans. In any case, large corporations could themselves access the capital markets on better terms than their bankers. The rationale for the traditional association of functions which we call a bank has simply disappeared, and most of these specific functions – retail marketing of financial services, financial advice to companies, monitoring the creditworthiness of large firms – are better done by some specialist institution which is not necessarily a bank.

 

Still, big banks remain big companies by any standards. There is a particular advantage for big retail banks in becoming financial conglomerates. It is the opportunity to use their retail deposit base as collateral for unrelated and risky activities in securities markets such as trading, market making and placing. For banks that are big enough to be too big to fail – banks whose collateral is effectively underwritten by the world’s governments – this opportunity is particularly valuable.

 

It is hard to believe that taxpayers would, if they focused on the issue, really choose to pledge their personal credit to allow banks to make speculative profits but in practice they have little choice. National banks have to compete internationally, and the attempt by the United States to enforce the separation of retail and investment banking ultimately proved unsuccessful. But the results are clear. Banks with large retail deposits have competitive advantages in providing other financial services that have nothing whatever to do with the skills and competences of these organisations – often the reverse. And regulation whose primary purpose is to protect small savers and investors has to be extended to the full range of wholesale market activities that big banks engage in.

 

Perhaps, if we were to have a world financial services regulator, this might be an issue to consider. Or perhaps, the issue will resolve itself. The problems which arise because retail deposits are pledged in support of proprietary trading, the problems which arise because the skills needed for a derivatives operation are very different from those of retail bankers, are not just problems for the world financial system. They are internal control and management problems for financial conglomerates themselves. And it will not be surprising if more companies come to the conclusion in the next few months that these management issues are too hard to handle.

 

 

.........most interesting thing out of all this was it was supposedly written

14 October 1998, Financial Times --- the same old normal.

 

I also thought Zdo you might appreciate this article which originally drew me to his website.

John Kay - Prosperity requires more than rule of law

[zdo 20]

SUIYA,

 

Thanks. Had time to just skim them...

 

I guess I look a little bit more at who is 'behind' the banks instead of ...

 

and from the link

 

sclerosis arising from the conflicting demands of too many established vested interests.

…

Property rights and rule of law

The biggest lies are the easiest lies…

Property rights ‘remain’ - but only paper now, … not ‘real’ anymore

And same for the rule of law – effectively, it is degrading... very far, very fast …

ie those two 'classics' definitely aren't enough to build and sustain a new or old norml...if they are now just caricatures

 

:haha:… and I bet half of those who read this will project that I’ve always been this distrustful of the ‘social contract’…

[zdo 20]

Lessons for your future banking strategies ... from the new normal Douche Bank

 

Deutsche Bank?s $10-Billion Scandal - The New Yorker

 

and btw, where the fk is SUIYA? Seems he got out before the getting was good...